Тек көрсетілетін
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S… Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 01-48-09)
In this video,
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we're going to go over a quick introduction to what endpoint threat
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hunting is before we start diving into it in a little more
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detail.
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So endpoint threat hunting is primarily performing
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a threat hunt based on IOCs and hypotheses
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and things like that that are typically geared just towards
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your endpoints.
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Now,
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When you're performing a threat hunt in an enterprise environment,
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you're not really going to be performing just an endpoint threat hunt
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or just a network threat hunt.
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You're going to be performing a threat hunt,
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going to be combining both network type and endpoint
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types of IOCs.
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We're just kind of breaking it apart here just to make it a little easier to understand.
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But when we're talking about our endpoint threat hunting,
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we're primarily talking about the IOCs and such that are associated with
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endpoint systems and that are also searched for on your endpoints
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or from your endpoint logs.
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These can be threat hunts that are geared primarily towards
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looking for indicators of compromise or looking for
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your TTPs as the kind of type of hunt you're
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performing.
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These IOCs,
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again, can be either the endpoint types of IOCs or the network
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types of IOCs.
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It's mainly the focus of where the threat hunt
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is looking for specific threats.
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And your threat hunts,
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just like any threat hunt at all,
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can begin with many different types of triggers,
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if you will.
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This can be specific intelligence information that the organization
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receives,
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either internally or externally through a vendor.
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This can be information or reports from your
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internal network team,
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your security operations center,
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anything like that.
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There's a lot of different ways a threat hunt.
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can begin and this is just a couple of different examples of that
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Normally,
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your endpoint threat hunts are going to be done on logs that have been
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collected from various different types of endpoint systems.
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This can be from your authentication logs,
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web application logs,
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any other application,
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any included built -in system events that are built in,
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for example,
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Windows, any logs like that.
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One important part when we're talking about Windows endpoint threat hunting
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is PowerShell.
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PowerShell is very commonly abused by attackers,
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so it is important to make sure the proper PowerShell logging
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is enabled and is going into your kind
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of central logging location.
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Again,
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these logs are going to be collected from many different locations across
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the enterprise.
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We have plenty of other courses and videos at I
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&E.
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for log collection,
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log analysis,
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things like that.
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So we're not going to go into kind of how to set up the logging infrastructure
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in this course.
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But typically these logs are going to be aggregated and collected
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into some sort of a centralized location,
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like a sim or a seam,
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depending on how you want to pronounce it,
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which a lot of times will be where the threat hunt takes place,
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or at least one of the primary locations that you are performing the hunt
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from.
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Now, every good threat hunt,
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every effective threat hunt,
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is going to start with some sort of a trigger or a hypothesis.
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When we're talking about our endpoint threat hunting,
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a couple of examples here.
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You have a hypothesis that attackers have compromised a
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workstation in the environment,
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and they're executing malicious files that match these
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specific file hashes.
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and are sending communication to a command and control server located at
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this specific IP address.
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This is an actionable hypothesis.
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It contains good information that you can use to start
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the threat hunt.
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Again,
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you would have specific caches and specific IP or IPs in
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this hypothesis to start that hunt.
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You could also have something like attackers have already established a foothold
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in the network,
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and for persistence means or persistence techniques,
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they've used...
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I've created administrative accounts in order to maintain their
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access.
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So again,
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you have an effective hypothesis.
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You have specific things to search for.
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In this case,
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you are searching for new account creation.
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And we'll get into detail as we go through this course about how
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to search for all of these.
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Let's look at just a couple of different types of IOCs that are typically
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associated with your endpoints as well.
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So we have your registry keys.
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These are going to be commonly used by attackers or abused by
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attackers for setting up things like auto -run or malicious services
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for their persistence mechanism.
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You also have things like your file names or your process
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names.
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These can be ones that are made to look like
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your more legitimate,
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for example,
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Windows services or Windows processes.
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Or it could be an instance of using those
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legitimate Windows files,
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in this case,
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for malicious purposes.
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There's many different ways to abuse your files here.
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But your file names,
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your process names can be considered or are considered indicators
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of compromise and can be used in searches for a
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threat hunt.
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You also have your file hashes.
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These are used to uniquely identify specific files
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and are very commonly used in your threat hunts.
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You have things like scheduled tasks and services that can
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be used or that are IOCs as well.
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Again, these are used and abused by your attackers for
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persistence mechanisms,
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mainly when we're talking about our scheduled tasks.
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And again, we'll get into the details of how to search for these.
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And these IOCs can come from many different locations
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to begin your threat hunt.
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For example,
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you can get these from various different intelligence sources,
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from third -party intelligence vendors or intelligence
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feeds that you're paying for.
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These can come from your reports from your ISACs,
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your information sharing and analysis centers.
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And again,
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you can get these from paid or free intelligence feeds.
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These can,
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again, come from an internal network team or your internal SOC.
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They can have these IOCs that they relay to the
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threat hunting team or threat hunting personnel to get a threat
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hunt started.
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And a lot of times you're going to search for these,
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you know,
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again, on your,
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you know,
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something like Splunk or Elk.
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But these will be found in system logs primarily.
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Again, there's a lot of different places to search for this.
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Systems logs are a very good example,
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and one of the primary places you'll be searching for these.
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These can be built -in system events like your
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Windows event logs.
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These can be individual application events,
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either from internal logging these applications do,
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or perhaps they may send these logs.
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to the Windows event logs as well.
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We'll talk about what Sysmon is and how it's useful,
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and there are several different events that are helpful to use,
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event IDs that are helpful to use when we're doing threat hunts,
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that are generated by Sysmon.
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And again,
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when we're performing a threat hunt,
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you're going to be combining your endpoint IOCs with your network
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IOCs.
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Again, we've separated them out here just to make it easier to kind of grasp the
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concepts.
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But a lot of times you're going to be combining these IOCs with
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others, especially for correlation purposes,
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and to kind of build the story of what an attacker has
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done as part of that threat hunt.
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And again, there's a lot more IOCs in this.
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This is just a few examples.
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We'll start getting into more details and more IOCs
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as we progress through the course.

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