2026-04-13 08-39-21
May 25, 2026 14:30
· 12:17
· English
· Whisper Turbo
· 2 דוברים
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
In this video,
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
we're going to take a look at Sysmon,
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
what Sysmon is,
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and how it is used in threat hunting.
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
So first of all,
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
let's take a look at really what is Sysmon.
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
We've talked about it several times throughout this course.
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Sysmon is part of Microsoft's Sysinternals suite
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
of tools,
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and its job is basically to monitor systems.
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and log additional activity into the Windows event
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log for various activities and actions that happen on the system.
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
This is done to kind of supplement and complement the logging
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
that's built into Windows because it does log additional
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
information that's not included in your default Windows event
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
logs.
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Things like information about newly created files on a
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
system or information about network connections.
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Now, there's a lot more than just these two.
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
We'll go over those here in just a minute,
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
but those are two very useful examples.
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
It operates on a Windows system as a system
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
service and a device driver and runs
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
as a protected process.
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Now,
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this protected process status is there to kind of disallows
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
a large range of interactions with the service
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
and the driver itself.
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
which kind of helps protect Sysmon from malicious activity.
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
It's not going to completely prevent any sort of malicious activity.
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
It could still be targeted,
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
but it does help protect it a little better as well.
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
So Sysmon,
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
when we're talking about threat hunting,
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
should be installed as on many Windows endpoints as you can,
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
as is needed for the organization,
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
depending on what your threat hunting activities look like.
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Again,
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
some data that is not logged by default
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
from your Windows events is important here
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
because it's needed for threat hunting.
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Now, we're not going to get into the process of how
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
to install Sysmon in this course or in this video.
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Microsoft has very good documentation on Sysmon.
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
The assumption for this course is that we're already past the preparation
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
phase for threat hunting and we're into the active threat hunts
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
at this point.
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
But it's still very important to understand Sysmon to be familiar with
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
the event IDs that it creates and what sort of information
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
you can get out of Sysmon.
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
And then again,
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
ideally,
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
as with any of your events and logging
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
data,
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
These should be forwarded to some sort of a centralized logging
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
platform, ideally where you're performing your threat hunts.
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Again, that's going to depend on the organizations.
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
So let's take a look at some of the things that Sysmon is
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
capable of doing.
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Number one,
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it can log information about newly created processes,
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including the full command that was entered to
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start a new process.
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And this includes the process that is run and also the parent
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process that launches it.
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
It can record the hash information of any process
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
or application that is launched on the system.
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
And that does,
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
that hash values get recorded in a couple of different algorithms.
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
I know it does MD5,
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
SHA -256,
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
and I believe one or two others that I can't remember off the top of my head.
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
But MD5 and SHA -256 being the kind of most
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
useful when we're talking about threat hunting and just cybersecurity in general.
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
It will also log information about drivers that are loaded into
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the system and DLLs that are loaded into the system,
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
including any signature information for those files,
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and then again,
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
the file hashes themselves.
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
It can log information about network connections,
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
including the process that initiated the network connection on that
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
system, IP address,
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port information,
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hostname information,
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if there is any hostname associated with it.
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Obviously, if the...
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network connection is initiated just to an IP address,
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you're not going to have any hostname information there.
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Any information about when files are created
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
or overwritten,
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
it will log information about those,
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including any changes to the file creation
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timestamp,
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
which is something attackers may commonly abuse as well.
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
So that's an overview of what Sysmon is capable
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
of doing.
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Let's take a look at the individual events that it
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launches now so you can have a better understanding of what these events are
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when it comes to searching for them in threat hunting.
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Event ID 1,
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and again, these are unique IDs to Sysmon.
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Event ID 1 is logged when a new process
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
is created and includes,
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again, the full command line information of the process that
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was launched,
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
including the hash of the file when it's launched.
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Event ID 2,
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like I just talked about,
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is logged when a process changes
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the file creation timestamp.
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Now, attackers might change the creation timestamp for various
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
different reasons to evade detection,
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
but there are processes that will also legitimately do this.
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
So the presence of this event does not necessarily mean there's malicious
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
activity,
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just like any other indicator.
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
But the context does matter there.
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Attackers will do this sometimes.
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So just be aware of that.
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Event ID 3 is logged when a network connection
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is initiated.
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And again, this includes the process information that initiated the network
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
connection, the source and destination IP addresses,
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the destination port,
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and again, the host name if that is relevant to the connection
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request.
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Event ID 6 is logged when new drivers are loaded and again includes
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the signature of the driver and hash information for that file.
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Event ID 8 is technically called the create remote
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thread event ID.
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This is logged when a thread is created inside
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another process.
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Basically, you'll have a process that creates a thread inside
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
another process,
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and this is very frequently used by malware as a form
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of code injection and to be able to hide from detection.
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This event will include information on the source and target processes
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
and information on the code that is being
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run in that new thread as well.
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So it includes information on the source,
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
target process,
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and the injected code as well.
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Event ID 9 is logged when there is a raw
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access to disk request.
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This will include information about the source process that
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initiated the request and the disk device that it's requesting access
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to as well.
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This is very frequently used by malware for reading data,
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exfiltrating data that might otherwise be locked through regular
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disk access.
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This is also a way that attackers can access information and
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files while attempting to evade file access
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auditing utilities.
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So any utilities or tools that might be monitoring file access on
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drives, this can potentially be a way to
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evade that detection by an attacker.
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Then you have event ID number 10.
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This is when a process opens another process.
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Usually this is going to be followed by reading
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or writing of the address space inside that second
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target process.
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This can be very helpful trying to detect malware that's
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designed to do things like steal credentials and various other
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malicious activities.
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Few more events we'll look at.
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Event ID 11 is when a file is created or a file is
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overwritten.
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This is a very useful event ID when it comes to threat hunting,
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
especially when you're looking at trying to detect any sort of
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payload downloads,
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
because as a file is downloaded and saved to disk,
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the file is created and would be logged here.
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This can also help detect and
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find
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modifications to auto run and auto start locations,
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because this can be done through new files created in
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specific locations,
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like the auto run location or auto start location for Windows.
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That can also be done in the registry,
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which is separate.
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We'll get to that here in just a second.
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
And it can also,
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like I said,
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monitor locations like temp folders and other common
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download locations,
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very common places for malware or for attackers to download malware.
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
And you have three event IDs for registry changes,
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event ID 12,
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13, and 14.
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12 being logged when any registry object is
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created or deleted.
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13 being when a registry value is modified
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or set.
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And 14 being when a key or value is renamed.
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Again,
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this can be useful for detecting modifications for
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services on the system or for,
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again, auto -run purposes because those can both be done within the
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registry.
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You have events IDs number 19,
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20, and 21 that are all related to various different WMI
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events.
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Event ID number 22 is logged whenever a process
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is trying to use
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a DNS query,
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and that is logged whether the query is successful or not,
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and whether the request is cached or not.
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And it will log information about the process that requested
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this DNS information as well.
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You have event ID number 23.
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This is logged when any files are deleted on
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the system.
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Now, in addition to logging the information about the
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file that's being deleted,
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It will also archive that deleted file to
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a location on the drive,
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and this is configurable in the Sysmon configuration.
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
So you will have a log of
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
the file that was deleted.
10:59
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Now you also have event ID 26,
11:02
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
which basically does the same thing.
11:03
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
It logs the information about a file being deleted,
11:06
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
but does not archive the file.
11:08
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
New event ID number 25.
11:10
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
This is logged when any sort of process tampering is detected.
11:15
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
This is useful when trying to detect process hiding
11:19
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
techniques as well.
11:22
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
There are more events than just these in
11:26
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Sysmon.
11:27
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Not a whole lot of them,
11:28
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
but there are more.
11:29
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
These are the kind of most useful ones when we're talking about
11:33
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
threat hunting.
11:34
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Now, one thing to note here,
11:36
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
not all of these events are going to be enabled by
11:40
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Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
default.
11:41
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
A good example there is event ID number three.
11:44
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
for logging network connections that one is not enabled by default it
11:48
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
needs to be configured to be turned on in the configuration file
11:53
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
when you are installing and configuring sysmon for
11:57
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
the first time on a system so a lot of useful information you
12:01
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
can get out of these events using sysmon but just remember there
12:06
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
is some configuration that's required to enable some of
12:10
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Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
this logging information
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