2026-04-13 08-39-21
May 25, 2026 14:30
· 12:17
· English
· Whisper Turbo
· 2 वक्ता
यो प्रतिलिपि आज म्याद समाप्त हुन्छ ।
स्थायी भण्डारणका लागि स्तरबृद्धि गर्नुहोस् →
देखाउँदै मात्र
0:07
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
In this video,
0:08
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
we're going to take a look at Sysmon,
0:10
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
what Sysmon is,
0:12
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
and how it is used in threat hunting.
0:16
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
So first of all,
0:16
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
let's take a look at really what is Sysmon.
0:19
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
We've talked about it several times throughout this course.
0:22
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Sysmon is part of Microsoft's Sysinternals suite
0:27
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
of tools,
0:28
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
and its job is basically to monitor systems.
0:33
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
and log additional activity into the Windows event
0:37
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
log for various activities and actions that happen on the system.
0:42
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
This is done to kind of supplement and complement the logging
0:47
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
that's built into Windows because it does log additional
0:51
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
information that's not included in your default Windows event
0:55
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
logs.
0:55
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Things like information about newly created files on a
0:59
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
system or information about network connections.
1:03
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Now, there's a lot more than just these two.
1:05
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
We'll go over those here in just a minute,
1:07
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
but those are two very useful examples.
1:10
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
It operates on a Windows system as a system
1:14
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
service and a device driver and runs
1:18
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
as a protected process.
1:21
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Now,
1:21
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
this protected process status is there to kind of disallows
1:26
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
a large range of interactions with the service
1:30
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
and the driver itself.
1:32
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
which kind of helps protect Sysmon from malicious activity.
1:36
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
It's not going to completely prevent any sort of malicious activity.
1:40
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
It could still be targeted,
1:41
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
but it does help protect it a little better as well.
1:44
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
So Sysmon,
1:46
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
when we're talking about threat hunting,
1:48
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
should be installed as on many Windows endpoints as you can,
1:52
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
as is needed for the organization,
1:54
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
depending on what your threat hunting activities look like.
1:59
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Again,
2:00
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
some data that is not logged by default
2:04
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
from your Windows events is important here
2:08
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
because it's needed for threat hunting.
2:11
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Now, we're not going to get into the process of how
2:15
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
to install Sysmon in this course or in this video.
2:19
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Microsoft has very good documentation on Sysmon.
2:24
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
The assumption for this course is that we're already past the preparation
2:28
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
phase for threat hunting and we're into the active threat hunts
2:32
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
at this point.
2:33
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
But it's still very important to understand Sysmon to be familiar with
2:37
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
the event IDs that it creates and what sort of information
2:41
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
you can get out of Sysmon.
2:43
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
And then again,
2:44
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
ideally,
2:45
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
as with any of your events and logging
2:49
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
data,
2:50
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
These should be forwarded to some sort of a centralized logging
2:54
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
platform, ideally where you're performing your threat hunts.
2:57
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Again, that's going to depend on the organizations.
2:59
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
So let's take a look at some of the things that Sysmon is
3:03
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
capable of doing.
3:05
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Number one,
3:06
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
it can log information about newly created processes,
3:10
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
including the full command that was entered to
3:14
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
start a new process.
3:16
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
And this includes the process that is run and also the parent
3:20
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
process that launches it.
3:22
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
It can record the hash information of any process
3:27
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
or application that is launched on the system.
3:30
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
And that does,
3:31
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
that hash values get recorded in a couple of different algorithms.
3:35
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
I know it does MD5,
3:37
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
SHA -256,
3:38
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
and I believe one or two others that I can't remember off the top of my head.
3:42
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
But MD5 and SHA -256 being the kind of most
3:46
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
useful when we're talking about threat hunting and just cybersecurity in general.
3:51
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
It will also log information about drivers that are loaded into
3:55
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
the system and DLLs that are loaded into the system,
3:58
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
including any signature information for those files,
4:02
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
and then again,
4:02
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
the file hashes themselves.
4:04
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
It can log information about network connections,
4:07
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
including the process that initiated the network connection on that
4:11
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
system, IP address,
4:13
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
port information,
4:14
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
hostname information,
4:15
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
if there is any hostname associated with it.
4:18
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Obviously, if the...
4:20
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
network connection is initiated just to an IP address,
4:23
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
you're not going to have any hostname information there.
4:25
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Any information about when files are created
4:30
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
or overwritten,
4:31
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
it will log information about those,
4:33
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
including any changes to the file creation
4:37
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
timestamp,
4:38
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
which is something attackers may commonly abuse as well.
4:42
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
So that's an overview of what Sysmon is capable
4:47
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
of doing.
4:47
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Let's take a look at the individual events that it
4:51
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
launches now so you can have a better understanding of what these events are
4:55
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
when it comes to searching for them in threat hunting.
5:00
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Event ID 1,
5:01
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
and again, these are unique IDs to Sysmon.
5:04
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Event ID 1 is logged when a new process
5:09
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
is created and includes,
5:10
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
again, the full command line information of the process that
5:14
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
was launched,
5:15
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
including the hash of the file when it's launched.
5:19
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Event ID 2,
5:21
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
like I just talked about,
5:22
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
is logged when a process changes
5:26
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
the file creation timestamp.
5:29
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Now, attackers might change the creation timestamp for various
5:33
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
different reasons to evade detection,
5:36
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
but there are processes that will also legitimately do this.
5:40
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
So the presence of this event does not necessarily mean there's malicious
5:44
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
activity,
5:45
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
just like any other indicator.
5:48
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
But the context does matter there.
5:50
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Attackers will do this sometimes.
5:53
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
So just be aware of that.
5:55
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Event ID 3 is logged when a network connection
5:59
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
is initiated.
6:00
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
And again, this includes the process information that initiated the network
6:04
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
connection, the source and destination IP addresses,
6:07
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
the destination port,
6:09
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
and again, the host name if that is relevant to the connection
6:13
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
request.
6:14
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Event ID 6 is logged when new drivers are loaded and again includes
6:18
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
the signature of the driver and hash information for that file.
6:23
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Event ID 8 is technically called the create remote
6:27
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
thread event ID.
6:29
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
This is logged when a thread is created inside
6:33
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
another process.
6:35
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Basically, you'll have a process that creates a thread inside
6:39
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
another process,
6:40
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
and this is very frequently used by malware as a form
6:44
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
of code injection and to be able to hide from detection.
6:49
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
This event will include information on the source and target processes
6:53
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
and information on the code that is being
6:57
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
run in that new thread as well.
7:01
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
So it includes information on the source,
7:04
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
target process,
7:05
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
and the injected code as well.
7:07
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Event ID 9 is logged when there is a raw
7:11
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
access to disk request.
7:14
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
This will include information about the source process that
7:18
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
initiated the request and the disk device that it's requesting access
7:22
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
to as well.
7:24
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
This is very frequently used by malware for reading data,
7:28
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
exfiltrating data that might otherwise be locked through regular
7:32
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
disk access.
7:33
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
This is also a way that attackers can access information and
7:37
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
files while attempting to evade file access
7:41
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
auditing utilities.
7:43
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
So any utilities or tools that might be monitoring file access on
7:47
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
drives, this can potentially be a way to
7:51
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
evade that detection by an attacker.
7:53
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Then you have event ID number 10.
7:57
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
This is when a process opens another process.
8:01
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Usually this is going to be followed by reading
8:05
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
or writing of the address space inside that second
8:09
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
target process.
8:10
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
This can be very helpful trying to detect malware that's
8:15
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
designed to do things like steal credentials and various other
8:19
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
malicious activities.
8:21
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Few more events we'll look at.
8:23
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Event ID 11 is when a file is created or a file is
8:27
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
overwritten.
8:28
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
This is a very useful event ID when it comes to threat hunting,
8:32
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
especially when you're looking at trying to detect any sort of
8:36
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
payload downloads,
8:38
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
because as a file is downloaded and saved to disk,
8:41
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
the file is created and would be logged here.
8:44
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
This can also help detect and
8:48
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
find
8:51
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
modifications to auto run and auto start locations,
8:54
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
because this can be done through new files created in
8:58
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
specific locations,
9:00
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
like the auto run location or auto start location for Windows.
9:03
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
That can also be done in the registry,
9:05
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
which is separate.
9:06
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
We'll get to that here in just a second.
9:07
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
And it can also,
9:09
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
like I said,
9:09
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
monitor locations like temp folders and other common
9:14
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
download locations,
9:15
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
very common places for malware or for attackers to download malware.
9:20
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
And you have three event IDs for registry changes,
9:24
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
event ID 12,
9:25
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
13, and 14.
9:26
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
12 being logged when any registry object is
9:30
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
created or deleted.
9:32
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
13 being when a registry value is modified
9:36
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
or set.
9:36
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
And 14 being when a key or value is renamed.
9:41
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Again,
9:42
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
this can be useful for detecting modifications for
9:48
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
services on the system or for,
9:51
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
again, auto -run purposes because those can both be done within the
9:56
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
registry.
9:57
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
You have events IDs number 19,
9:59
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
20, and 21 that are all related to various different WMI
10:04
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
events.
10:04
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Event ID number 22 is logged whenever a process
10:09
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
is trying to use
10:13
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
a DNS query,
10:14
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
and that is logged whether the query is successful or not,
10:19
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
and whether the request is cached or not.
10:22
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
And it will log information about the process that requested
10:26
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
this DNS information as well.
10:29
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
You have event ID number 23.
10:33
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
This is logged when any files are deleted on
10:37
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
the system.
10:38
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Now, in addition to logging the information about the
10:42
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
file that's being deleted,
10:44
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
It will also archive that deleted file to
10:48
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
a location on the drive,
10:50
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
and this is configurable in the Sysmon configuration.
10:53
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
So you will have a log of
10:57
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
the file that was deleted.
10:59
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Now you also have event ID 26,
11:02
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
which basically does the same thing.
11:03
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
It logs the information about a file being deleted,
11:06
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
but does not archive the file.
11:08
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
New event ID number 25.
11:10
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
This is logged when any sort of process tampering is detected.
11:15
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
This is useful when trying to detect process hiding
11:19
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
techniques as well.
11:22
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
There are more events than just these in
11:26
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Sysmon.
11:27
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Not a whole lot of them,
11:28
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
but there are more.
11:29
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
These are the kind of most useful ones when we're talking about
11:33
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
threat hunting.
11:34
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
Now, one thing to note here,
11:36
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
not all of these events are going to be enabled by
11:40
S…
Speaker 2 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
default.
11:41
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
A good example there is event ID number three.
11:44
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
for logging network connections that one is not enabled by default it
11:48
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
needs to be configured to be turned on in the configuration file
11:53
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
when you are installing and configuring sysmon for
11:57
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
the first time on a system so a lot of useful information you
12:01
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
can get out of these events using sysmon but just remember there
12:06
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
is some configuration that's required to enable some of
12:10
S…
Speaker 1 (2026-04-13 08-39-21)
this logging information
यो प्रतिलिपि AI (स्वचालित वक्तव्य पहिचान) द्वारा उत्पन्न गरिएको थियो । त्रुटि समावेश गर्न सक्छ - महत्वपूर्ण प्रयोगका लागि मौलिक अडियोसँग रुजु गर्नुहोस् । AI नीति
सारांश
यो लिखितको AI सारांश उत्पन्न गर्न सारांश गर्नुहोस् क्लिक गर्नुहोस् ।
सारांश गर्दैछ...
यो प्रतिलिपि बारे AI सोध्नुहोस्
यो transcript बारेमा केही सोध्नुहोस् - एआई सम्बन्धित खण्डहरू र जवाफ पाउनुहुनेछ.